Key Victory at the Madras High Court – Ex-parte Injunction Vacated in the “BOUNCE” Trademark Dispute

Case Title/Citation: A Nos.3226 & 3227, 4221 to 4236 of 2025 & O.A. Nos.176 to 179 of 2025 in C.S(COMM DIV) No.56 of 2025

Court:The High Court of Judicature at Madras

Date Pronounced:24.10.2025

Coram: The Honourable Mr. Justice N. Senthilkumar

Parties

Spalon India Private Limited, represented by its authorised representative Ms. Sneh Koticha [Plaintiff/Applicant]- Represented byMr. M. S. Bharath

Maya Choudhary, Trading as Bounce Salon and Makeover Studio [Defendant/Respondent]- Represented by Mr. A. Jayesh Kumar Daga

Summary - The present matter pertains to a trademark dispute, wherein the Ld. Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court of Madras vide order dated 24.10.2025 vacated an earlier ex-parte interim injunction that was passed against the respondent on 12.03.2025. The Court found "notable differences" between the plaintiff's simple word mark "BOUNCE" and the respondent's composite mark. The Court further held that there was no justification to curtail the respondent's business operation, which was based exclusively in Udaipur, until the infringement claim could be proved during the full trial, concluding that continuation of the injunction would cause the defendant irreparable damages. The plaintiff’s preferred an appeal against the said order dated 24.10.2025. The Hon’ble Division bench vide order dated 21.11.2025 dismissed the appeals filed by the plaintiff thereby upholding the order of the Ld. Single judge.

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Contentions raised by the Plaintiff

The plaintiff is a premier salon chain that has used "BOUNCE" since it was conceptualized in 2004, with the founder, Mrs. Latha C. Mohan, being a pioneer in this field, having various marks, of which. The mark has been used extensively over the years, resulting in wide acclaim, goodwill, and the acquisition of secondary meaning, associating "BOUNCE" only with the plaintiff.

  • The Respondent’s misuse restricts the plaintiff's ability to commercially expand their operations throughout India, especially in Udaipur, where the defendant is located and carrying out their business.
  • In the modern digital age, the geographical reach of a trademark cannot be confined only to the physical locations. The plaintiff asserted that their mark enjoys throughout India recognition and protection due to its online presence and continuous promotional use.
  • Relying on the Supreme Court's Midas Hygiene judgment, the plaintiff argued that in cases of infringement, an injunction must normally follow if a prima facie case is established, and mere delay is not sufficient to defeat it.

Contention raised by the Defendant/Respondent

  • The defendant has uninterruptedly been using the mark “Bounce Hair Saloon and Makeover Studio” ever since 2017 in respect of Saloon and Makeover services in the city of Udaipur.
  • The marks are phonetically, visually and structurally distinct. The plaintiff's trademark consists of only the word “BOUNCE”, whereas the defendant uses a composite mark “Bounce Salon & Makeover Studio”, which includes a logo depicting a graphic of scissors, eight stars, and a circular seal.
  • “Bounce” is a generic term common to the trade and of a non-distinctive character, describing desirable hair qualities that are full, healthy and dynamic. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim an absolute or exclusive monopoly over the term.
  • The plaintiff failed to file relevant documents like an assignment deed, trademark assignment form, or official record to legally establish that the mark “BOUNCE” was validly assigned to Spalon India Private Limited.
  • There is no likelihood of confusion because the target audiences are entirely different. The plaintiff operates in Chennai, Bengaluru, and Hyderabad, while the defendant's operations are strictly limited to presently threelocal outlets in Udaipur, Rajasthan. The plaintiff has no commercial footprint or customer base in Udaipur.
  • Defendant/Respondent further contended that the plaintiff has failed to establish the three necessary ingredients for injunctive relief, viz., prima facie case, irreparable loss, and balance of convenience. The defendant
  • The plaintiff remained silent after issuing two cease and desist notices in 2023 and failed to initiate any legal proceedings immediately, though having complete knowledge about the defendant/ respondent’s business, reflecting deliberate delay and negating the claim of irreparable harm.

Judgment

The Court allowed the defendant/ respondent’s applications (A Nos.3226 & 3227 of 2025) and vacated the interim injunction that was granted in the prior judicial pronouncement.

Key Points Inferred from the Judgment:

  1. The court held that there were "notable differences in the trademark, logo and design of the plaintiff and defendant". The plaintiff’s mark ('BOUNCE') was held to be a generic term common to the trade, while the defendant used the composite mark ('Bounce Salon and Makeover Studio').
  2. Citing Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the Court emphasized that the Defendant/Respondent was entitled to use its trademark “Bounce Salon and Makeover Studio” taken as a whole, and since the plaintiff's registered mark “BOUNCE” is generic, its registration does not confer an exclusive monopoly right over that part alone.
  3. The Court explicitly stated that the Supreme Court ruling relied upon by the plaintiff (Midas Hygiene) was "not applicable to the present case as the trademark of the plaintiff is not deceptively similar to the trademark of the defendant".
  4. Given that the defendant is based in Udaipur and the question of infringement is a matter for trial, the court found no justification in curtailing the business operation of the defendant at this stage.
  5. Continuation of the injunction order until the disposal of the suit would cause irreparable damages to the defendant who has been carrying on business since 2017.

Observation by the Hon’ble Division Bench on the appeals preferred by the Plaintiff -

  • The Court found the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondent to be “absolutely acceptable and in consonance with Judicial pronouncements”.
  • The Court further noted its opinion that the appeals had been filed “just to protract and frustrate the process of trial pending before the learned Single Judge”, and hence Hence, found no merit in the appeals
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